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INTRODUCTION: EL-SHIFA ATTEMPTS TO REINVIGORATE A TIRED DOCTRINE
In the summer of 2000, the Sudanese owner of a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan
filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims' asserting a right to just
* Thanks to Steve Clark, Professor Jayne Barnard, Professor Eric Kades, and Professor
Charles Koch for their kind aid and feedback while this argument emerged. I also thank Tom
and Jen Hanrahan for their supportive feedback.
1 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751,751,754 (2003), affid, 378
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compensation under the Fifth Amendment.2 President Clinton declared the plant
enemy property and launched a military strike against it3 based on military intelli-
gence claims that the plant abetted Osama bin Laden4 and manufactured weapons
of mass destruction.5 The suit amounted to a foreign enemy seeking just compensa-
tion for property destroyed in military action.' The court dismissed the complaint
with a persuasive summary of the priorjurisprudence concerning the extraterritorial
scope of the Takings Clause.7 It also strongly urged the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit to clearly cut the root of extraterritorial takings jurisprudence:
Turney v. United States.9
The assertion El-Shifa presented was a critical opportunity to define the
extraterritorial scope of the Takings Clause. This Note urges that at the next
opportunity, the United States Court for the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court
of the United States should clearly overrule extraterritorial Fifth Amendment protection
for alien property located and seized abroad. Either court should marginalize Turney
as an aberration rather than use it as a basis for a near universal right to just com-
pensation. Ultimately, the Takings Clause must be justly defined to reduce the
United States' exposure to collateral attack on its military activity.
This inquiry will first explore the legal stakes at hand in overruling Turney's
innovation, including legal grounds for reversing Turney. Secondly, the inquiry will
proceed to the undercurrents of this debate. At its base, this debate reflects another
struggle over the underlying theories of constitutional rights: whether constitutional
rights are bound by physical territory, limited by government-actor relationships, or
inalienably every person's entitlement. If a court were to overrule Turney, it could
not help but base the reversal in this theoretical debate. Finally, the inquiry will proceed
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Salah El Din Ahmed Mohammed Idris, the owner of EI-Shifa
Pharmaceutical Industries Company, initially filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims
Act in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 754.
2 Id. at 754. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 See Bill Gertz, Bombing Scenario Matches August's; Reminder to Some of 'Wag the
Dog', WASH. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1998, at All; see also Colum Lynch, Allied Doubts Grow About
the US Strike on Sudanese Plant, B. GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1998, at A2 (describing critiques by
U.S. allies of the U.S. strikes against Sudan).
' Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and
Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1460, 1460-61 (Aug. 20, 1998).
' Id.; see also Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden,
24 YALE J. IT'L L. 559 (1999) (reviewing Sudanese connections with al-Qaeda including
mixing peaceful with military pharmaceutical operations).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000) (waiving sovereign immunity for this purpose).
See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus., 55 Fed. Cl. at 764-74, affid, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005).
' Id. at 762-64.
9 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953). Two of five judges dissented in part: agreeing with the
court's disposition but not the rationale. See id. at 465 (Jones, C.J., dissenting in part).
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to a deeper political undercurrent: attempts to siphon power from the Executive in parti-
cular and the United States in general. The political stakes will emerge and amplify the
gravity of foreign takings entitlements in an age of terror.
A. Turney Authors an Extension of the Takings Clause
In Turney, the United States Court of Claims ruled that a Philippine seizure of
foreign property from a foreign corporation"° constituted a valid claim for just com-
pensation against the United States. The United States sold surplus property to the
Philippine government, which allocated it to businessmen operating from China." After
the purchasers transferred ownership of the property to a foreign corporation they
formed, 2 corporate employees discovered classified United States Air Force equipment
among the surplus property.'3 When the Philippine government learned of this fact,
it seized the classified property. 4 The foreign corporation's receiver filed for just
compensation from the United States and won. 5
The court seemed persuaded by several unique factors: the Philippine government
was so dependent upon the United States that its actions were essentially actions of
the United States; 6 the owners formed the corporation for the sole purpose of selling the
property to the Chinese military;" the United States military classified the property to
'0 The corporation was Filipino. Turney v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 202, 218 (1953); see
also Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601,603 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (referencing the court's very
recent decision in Turney concerning "an alien corporation").
" Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 458-59. In the contract of sale, the United States disclaimed
liability for the condition of the property even though the Philippine government owned the
property by act of Congress. See id. at 459. Hong Kong residents paid more than half the
purchase price. See id. at 458-59.
12 Id. at 459. The court concluded, "We have no doubt that title to the radar equipment
passed to [plaintiffs]." Id. at 463. This point was in tight dispute. See id.
"3 Id. at 459.
"4 "[An officer or enlisted man of the [United States] Army would be designated ... as
an agent of the Philippine Government in supervising the segregation and security of the
radar." Id. at 460 (emphasis added). The court held that the subsequent segregation was the
moment the property was taken. Id. at 464.
15 Id. at 464.
16 See id. at 463. The army personnel who physically "segregated the radar" acted as
"agent[s] of the Philippine Government." Id. at 460. Additionally, when the United States
asked for an embargo on the property, the court held the Philippine government "naturally,
readily complied," as if the government did not act of its own volition. Id. at 463.
17 Id. at 458-59. This seemed to lower the threshold for piercing the corporate veil through
the corporation's foreign allegiance to the founders' American association. Curiously, the
corporation relied only upon judicial relief from Philippine tribunals rather than United States
judicial relief. See id. at 463 ("The minutes [of the meeting authorizing corporate dissolution]
... specifically authorized the plaintiff... to prosecute and defend suits in Philippine tribunals,
but made no mention of a suit in this court .... We do not know the reason for the omission.").
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protect national security; 8 and, most importantly, a grant of judicial relief would
not present "inconvenience or practical difficulty."' 9
The court had ample alternative bases for reaching the same conclusion aside
from finding a Fifth Amendment taking. Chief Judge Jones's partial dissent succinctly
explored these points.' ° Military regulations in force at the time prohibited declaring
classified military property as surplus, which precluded the officials' authority to
sell the equipment.2' Alternatively, the court could have rescinded the contract as a
mutual mistake of fact because neither the buyer nor seller knew of or intended to
exercise a transfer of classified technology.22 Instead, the court pioneered an expansion
of the Fifth Amendment to supply just compensation to aliens whose foreign property
was seized by a foreign government.23
B. The Tumey Court Reinforces its Error
One year after Turney, the same court decided Seery v. United States24 and
permitted another claim for Fifth Amendment just compensation-this time for a
citizen's land seized by the United States military in Austria.25 The court referred to
Turney and confessed, "We recognized that there were no precedents upon the question,
but it seemed to us that, since the Constitutional provision could be applied, without
inconvenience, to such a situation, it ought to be so applied., 26 Of all the possible
distinctions between Seery and Turney, the court highlighted convenience. Because
s Id. at 459.
19 Id. at 464. Note the United States Air Force offered to demilitarize or replace the
property before seizing it. Id. at 459. Perhaps the court should have employed safer judicial
grounding by ordering the contract rescinded due to mutual mistake of fact. Chief Judge
Jones offered this point in his partial dissent. Id. at 465 (Jones, C.J., dissenting in part).
20 See id. at 465.
21 "[Pjacific Air Service Command had issued a directive relative to surplus declarations
which said: '(6) Under no condition will any radar equipment be declared to the disposal
agency."' Id. at 459 (majority opinion). See also Chief Judge Jones's conclusion that the
regulation meant "the officials in charge had no authority to make a declaration of surplus that
would include such equipment." Id. at 465 (Jones, C.J., dissenting in part). But see id. at 463
(majority opinion) ("We have no doubt that title to the radar equipment passed to [plaintiffs].").
22 See, e.g., id. at 459 ("Neither the buyers nor those who made the sale for the Government
were aware, when the sale was made, that there was radar equipment among the supplies at the
depot."); id. at 465 (Jones, C.J., dissenting in part) ("There was therefore a mutual mistake of
fact."). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981) (A party assumes the
risk of a mistake when "he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge
as sufficient .... ").
23 Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 465.
24 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
25 Id. at 602-03.
26 Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
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the court recently permitted just compensation for an alien whose foreign property
was seized by a foreign nation, it would not be extraordinary to authorize the same for
a citizen's foreign land the United States seized directly.27 Once the outer limit of
Tumey seemed "convenient," the jurisprudence had much room to grow.
The unfortunate juxtaposition of a peacetime foreign taking in Turney with a
military foreign taking in Seery clouded the scope of Turney's exceptional accommoda-
tion. At the time the court decided Turney, it was exceptional because many other
controversies involving military takings explicitly denied just compensation.28
Turney formally considered a taking by the Philippine government that the United
States military executed,29 but Seery's reinforcement may have clouded that critical
distinction. El-Shifa illustrated the potential harm of blurring this distinction.
From Turney to El-Shifa, the time has come to reexamine alien extraterritorial
claims for just compensation. These claims have become "inconvenient," and argu-
ments like those in El-Shifa may portend more inconvenience, particularly in a climate
of asymmetrical, global combat against terror.30
C. A Modem Court Repeats Turney's Error
Although E1-Shifa' s argument that a foreign military enemy should succeed in
a cause forjust compensation is striking, the appellate court's grounds for affirming
the dismissal are even more surprising. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit expressly considered the lower court's well-wrought plea to reverse
the tired doctrine of Turney,3' but it parried the issue. It chose to dismiss the matter
as a non-justiciable political question.3 2 By allowing E1-Shifa to reach justiciability,
27 Id. ("In the Turney case... the plaintiff was an alien corporation, whereas the instant
plaintiff is an American citizen. If that fact is material, it is to her advantage."). In Seery, the
government argued against the plaintiff's claim for just compensation merely because the
property was located abroad. Id.
28 See, e.g., Mrs. Perrin's Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 543 (1868) (denying just compensation for military
action abroad destroying American-owned property), affid, 79 U.S. 315 (1871).
29 Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 460 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
30 See Kurt M. Campbell, Senior Vice President & Director, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services: Foreign
Policy and National Security Just Became Twice as Hard (Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.csis.
org/media/csis/congress/ts05O928campbell.pdf (congressional testimony noting the special
difficulties of global, asymmetrical combat involving arms, propaganda, and theocratic fascism).
3' EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("We are hesitant to accept this invitation to the extent that it asks us to expressly overrule
Turney."), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005). The court stated it must review Turney en
banc to overrule it. Id. Then, the court denied a rehearing en banc. See EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus.
Co. v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 27982 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
32 EI-Shifa, 378 F.3d at 1352. ("[B]ecause we think the appellants' takings claim at
bottom presents a nonjusticiable political question, we are not required to explore whether
Turney enjoys any continuing vitality .. "). By allowing the controversy to penetrate to the
2006]
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the court of opened the door to separation of powers issues rather than stopping the
advance at standing. The court passed a ripe opportunity to overrule Tumey, thereby
perpetuating future causes of actions for extraterritorial takings.
Consequently, El-Shifa pursued its end of resurrecting Turney' s narrow holding.
In El-Shifa's petition for certiorari,33 the company argued that war powers of the
President, including designations of enemy property, are justiciable after Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,34 in which the Supreme Court authorized judicial review of executive desig-
nations of enemy combatants.35 If the courts may review executive declarations of
enemy combatants, they ought to review executive declarations of enemy property. If
a petitioner like El-Shifa succeeds in tapping into territorial expansions of other consti-
tutional rights, this success would advance a glacial shift in Takings Clause juris-
prudence by generalizing the Turney exception.36 Such arguments blur the distinction
between foreign military takings and other foreign takings. Presently, there is still
"no simple rule in the Federal Circuit that excludes foreign-owned, foreign-situated
property 37 from sustaining a valid takings claim. After fifty years, there should be.
I. THE LEGAL STAKES
There are three classes of takings claims in this debate: American-owned
property located abroad,3 8 alien-owned property located within the United
political question doctrine, a court would entertain argument on several factors:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Justiciability questions what may be heard, but it
is still logically subsidiary in a particular controversy to who may argue it.
33 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 125
S. Ct. 2963 (2005) (No. 04-1291).
34 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
35 Id. at 533.
36 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 125
S. Ct. 2963 (2005) (No. 04-1291) (placing the controversy in context of internationalizing
other constitutional rights).
3' EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751,762 (2003), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005); see also Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl.
1953) ('There is no decision directly in point.").
38 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (denying just
compensation for destruction of American property in the Philippines); Langenegger v. United
[Vol. 15:335
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States,39 and alien-owned property located abroad.' For simplicity, these classes
are collectively referred to as foreign takings. Courts have created different doctrines
for these general classes, but the military necessity doctrine overarches foreign
takings and usually precludes a claim.4' This section explains this overarching doctrine
and then explores foreign takings doctrine for each general class.
A. Military Necessity Usually Precludes a Foreign Takings Claim
The international scope of the Takings Clause arises in a few classes of controver-
sies, most of which involve the military,42 so the military necessity doctrine pervades
States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (regarding taking American coffee plantation in El
Salvador), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 453
F.2d 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (denying that seizure of American property in the Dominican Republic
was a taking); Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. United States, 396 F.2d 467 (Ct.
Cl. 1968) (holding that seizure of American property in Panama was not a taking), affid, 395
U.S. 85 (1969); Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (holding that American
property seized in Austria was a taking); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99 (1907)
(holding that American property destroyed in Cuba was not a taking), affid, 212 U.S. 297
(1909); Green v. United States (Green's Case), 10 Ct. Cl. 466 (1874) (holding that property in
Tennessee seized by the Union during the Civil War was not a taking); Mrs. Perrin's Case, 4
Ct. Cl. 543 (1868) (holding that American property destroyed in Nicaragua was not a taking),
affid, 79 U.S. 315 (1871).
31 See, e.g., Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480 (1947) (holding that a
Swiss owner of property seized in America may maintain suit); Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (holding that plaintiff suing over Russian contract seized
in United States may maintain suit); Casa de Cambio Comdiv S.A. v. United States, 291 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that Mexican property seized in the United States was not a
taking), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921 (2003).
40 See, e.g., Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815)
(regarding Danish property in British custody); EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,
378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that suit over Sudanese property in Sudan was
precluded), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005); Turney, 115 F. Supp. 457 (holding that
Chinese property seized in the Philippines was a taking); Hoffman v. United States, 53 F.
Supp. 2d 483 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying suit over German property seized from Nazis), vacated
on other grounds, 17 F. App'x 980 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002).
"' Logically, standing precedes inquiry into military necessity, which acts like an affirmative
defense. Courts seem to prefer dismissing the cause of action for military necessity because it
reaches the substance of the claim whether or not the petitioner has standing. See generally
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 199 (bypassing standing issues to preclude
cause of action by military necessity). This Note necessarily argues standing ought to
precede substance.
42 The minority of controversies concern takings not directly associated with the military.
See Russian Volunteer Fleet, 282 U.S. at 481 (holding that Executive Order effected the
taking); Gasser v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 476 (1988) (considering Mexican property flooded
by Hoover Dam construction), withdrawn, 22 Cl. Ct. 165 (1990) (parties settled for compen-
sation); Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 460 (holding that Philippine government effected a peacetime
2006]
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foreign takings claims. This doctrine generally insulates the United States against
takings conducted by the military under sudden, extreme emergency.43 According to
this doctrine, courts deny claims for just compensation when the taking seeks to defeat
an enemy or protect troops.' Necessity does not immunize the United States from a
claim for just compensation, however, when the taking seeks to affirmatively promote
United States military activity, except for destruction. 5
This exception is probably grounded in the power an English sovereign retained:
seizing private property in defense of the realm.' Just compensation did not accompany
a king's taking but did accompany a Parliament's taking, which was more often to
advance public welfare.4 7 This historical distinction is useful for understanding modem
common law distinctions along the same divide.
taking although United States military agents were used).
41 See CalTex, 344 U.S. at 154 ("[T]he common law had long recognized that in times of
imminent peril-such as when fire threatened a whole community-the sovereign could, with
immunity, destroy the property of a few .. "); United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623,
629 (1871) ("Such a taking of private property by the government, when the emergency of the
public service in time of war or impending public danger is too urgent to admit of delay, is every-
where regarded as justified, if the necessity for the use of the property is imperative and immediate,
and the danger... is impending."). For an outstanding review of the historical origin of takings,
see generally Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11
ENvru L. 1, 8-13 (1980) (distinguishing the King's inherent power to protect the realm from Par-
liament's inherent power to improve the realm; only the latter gave rise to just compensation).
44 See Caltex, 344 U.S. at 153-54 ('The destruction or injury of private property in battle,
or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had to be borne
by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences.... [I]t was his imperative duty to direct their
destruction. The necessities of the war called for and justified this." (quoting United States v.
Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227,234 (1887))); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99, 101
(1907) (destroying plaintiffs foreign property was "necessary for the preservation of the health
of the troops ... [and] was a necessary incident to the military operations of the troops").
41 See Caltex, 344 U.S. at 155 ("[The property taken] was destroyed, not appropriated for
subsequent use."); Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. at 239 ("Military necessity will justify the destruction
of property, but [it] will not compel private parties to [bear] on their own lands works needed
by the government... [such as] bridges to facilitate the movements of troops, or... supplies
.... "); Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 629 (granting just compensation for taking American
civilian ships to aid troop movement during Civil War). Compare Wiggins v. United States (The
Wiggins's Case), 3 Ct. Cl. 412,422 (1867) (granting just compensation for military destruction
of property to prevent it from benefitting the enemy), with Mrs. Perrin's Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 543,547
(1868) (denying just compensation for same military action as The Wiggins's Case because
Wiggins's property "was not destroyed in hostile operations against the public enemy, but for
the purpose of preventing the aid and succor it would have afforded [the enemy]... ."), aff'd,
79 U.S. 315 (1871). The Supreme Court probably abrogated the distinction in The Wiggins's
Case in Caltex, 344 U.S. at 155-56 (denying just compensation for American property
destroyed abroad to prevent it from benefitting the enemy).
4 See Meidinger, supra note 43, at 8-13.
47 id.
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Hence, if the military necessity doctrine applies, the just compensation inquiry
usually ends. This is more often than not the case in foreign takings because of how
frequently the taking authority is the military. The doctrine does not apply, however,
when the military takes property outside exigency"8 or when the military is not the
taking authority.49 Within the subset of foreign takings outside military necessity,
the three general classifications of foreign takings determine the course of the
matter: whether the claimant is an alien or citizen and whether the property is
foreign or domestic.
B. Foreign Takings Doctrine Without Military Necessity Pivots According to Kind
1. American Property Seized Abroad
When a foreign taking involves the United States seizing American-owned
property abroad, courts authorize just compensation.5" The United States ought not
evade constitutional guarantees because its citizens are abroad. The Supreme Court
adopted the principle when it declared that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature
of the Constitution," and "the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provide to protect [a citizen's] life and liberty should not be stripped
away just because he happens to be in another land."5' In compliance with their
principle, courts sustain a citizen's cause of action against the United States forjust
compensation for taking foreign property.52
4 See Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (granting claim for just
compensation for taking an American's foreign house for officer's recreational club).
'9 Gasser v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 476 (1988) (holding that Hoover Dam construction
took the property), withdrawn, 22 Cl. Ct. 165 (1990) (parties settled for compensation);
Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (denying just
compensation for Hong Kong property seized by Allied Powers and not the United States),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955); Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 460 (Ct. Cl.
1953) (finding that Philippine government effected a taking although United States military
agents were used).
50 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). In a curious exception to military
necessity, the United States Court of Claims granted just compensation to a citizen's foreign
property seized during war. The Wiggins's Case, 3 Ct. Cl. at 422 (holding just compensation
for military necessity destruction arises "from the principles of natural justice and equity ....
Nor is it necessary to support it by further citations of authorities."). Judge Loring relied on
traditional military necessity to deny just compensation in his dissent. Id. at 424-25 (Loring, J.,
dissenting).
"' Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (holding that a citizen abroad retains right to
a jury trial).
52 See Seery, 127 F. Supp. 601 (granting claim for just compensation for taking an Ameri-
can's foreign house for officers' recreational club). Again, this assumes the military necessity
doctrine does not apply. See United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952)
(denying citizen's claim for just compensation for foreign property because military necessity
2006]
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2. Alien Property Seized Domestically
In the second class of foreign takings, when a foreign taking involves the United
States seizing an alien's property domestically, the Supreme Court extends just
compensation when the alien is a "friend" under Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States.53 The Supreme Court recently clarified the underlying principle in Russian
Volunteer Fleet: when a resident alien takes affirmative steps to develop "substantial
connections," constitutional protections accrue.54 Traditionally, allowing an alien
into the nation "implied protection,"55 so Verdugo- Urquidez' s "significant voluntary
connection[s]" test clarifies the standard.56
When a domestic alien fails to establish substantial connections, a court
dismisses a claim forj ust compensation.57 Alternatively, when the alien petitioner's
trumps). But see, e.g., Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(denying citizen's claim for just compensation for foreign property seized outside military ne-
cessity because United States involvement was too attenuated: "[T]he court must consider
whether the United States' involvement was sufficiently direct and substantial to warrant its
responsibility under the fifth amendment"); Anglo Chinese Shipping, 127 F. Supp. at 557 (deny-
ing claim for just compensation for foreign property seized because the United States was not
the taking authority). The Langenegger court dismissed the idea that the Philippine government
in Turney acted wholly under the coercion of the United States. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1571.
" Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481,489 (1931). The Supreme Court
looked to Wong Wing v. United States, which universalized Fourteenth Amendment coverage
to "all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the United States]." 163 U.S. 228,238 (1896).
The scope of the holding in Russian Volunteer Fleet is limited because at the time, Congress
specifically authorizedjust compensation for domestic seizure of the alien's property. Id. at 489
("The Congress recognized this duty [of compensation] in authorizing the expropriation.").
14 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,271 (1990) (denying application of
Fourth Amendment rights to Mexican citizen lacking substantial connections to the United
States). The Court limited the scope of prior holdings that grant constitutional protection for
resident aliens while simultaneously clarifying the underlying principle. Id.; cf. Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,770 (1950) (denying habeas corpus protection to nonresident alien
enemy, noting "[m]ere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe
conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more extensive and secure when he makes
preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen"). The Supreme Court based its holding
in Eisentrager on the principle that "the nonresident enemy alien, especially one who has
remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even this qualified access to our courts
... [nor may he] maintain an action in its courts during the period of hostilities." Id. at 776.
In the 2004 Term, the Supreme Court cautiously distinguished alien enemies in the War on
Terror from those in Eisentrager, overruling a lower decision that relied on Eisentrager to
deny extending due process. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476, 485 (2004) (implicitly
questioning Eisentrager).
s Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78.
56 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
5' See Hoffmann v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 483, 491 (D.D.C. 1999) (dismissing
claim for just compensation because plaintiff failed to establish "the existence of voluntary
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substantial connections relate to illegal activity, no constitutional protection accrues."
The Supreme Court recoiled at the supposition of extending constitutional protection to
aliens lacking such substantial connections:
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been
so significant an innovation in the practice of governments that,
if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite
contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited.... No
decision of this Court supports such a view.... None of the
learned commentators on our Constitution has even hinted at it.
The practice of every modem government is opposed to it.59
3. Alien Property Seized Abroad
The third general class of foreign takings involves an alien's property seized abroad.
Among the controversies in this class, Tumey goes the farthest afield to authorize just
compensation. Other controversies in the same general class turn to other grounds
for denying just compensation.60
In this respect, Turney stands as a lonely exception justified by mere convenience.6'
Outside the exigencies of war, the United States Court of Claims filled the juris-
prudential gap with ad hoc whim. As a result, once a petitioner has standing, it may
rebut military necessity and a court may entertain argument about how necessary
a military action was.
Immediately, the propriety of executive power is under review: whether the
military action was justified or merely discretionary or whether the United States acted
or contractual relationships with this country").
58 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778-79; cf Hoffmann, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (challenging
similar restriction under Trading with the Enemy Act).
" Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784-85 (citation omitted). One should note the Court thought
such an innovation was radical "in the practice of government" rather than just the United
States. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
' See, e.g., Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 199 (1815)
(authoring the doctrine of enemy soil to dismiss alien claim over alien property by construing
military necessity); Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909,917 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to extend
Fifth Amendment protection to alien seeking just compensation on narrow factual and
pleading grounds); Ashkirv. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438,444-45 (2000) (declining to find
any cause of action for alien claim regarding Somalian property despite Turney); Rosner v.
United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (denying alien takings claim over
foreign property, implicitly finding no cause of action for such a foreign taking, and disallow-
ing alien to convert the claim into one by a resident alien for lack of substantial connections).
" Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 464 (noting relief is justified as lacking "inconvenience or
practical difficulty"); see also Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 603 (Ct. Cl. 1955)
(confirming the holding in Turney that just compensation is applicable when such appliance
will not be "inconvenient").
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alone or in concert. A court is faced with political question and separation of powers
issues where a petitioner may find grounds to collaterally attack executive war power.
62
It is better to police the floodgate of standing than attempt to redirect the rushing waters
of political question doctrine and separation of powers. When the court in Turney
granted the cause of action, it relied on a logical kernel to justify reaching the sub-
stantive takings issue. To refute Turney, one must refute that logic.
C. Turney Relied on a Logical Kernel to Internationalize the Constitution
When the United States Court of Claims found a cause of action for just compensa-
tion in Turney, it adopted Turney's logic thatjust because some constitutional rights
do not extend abroad, the Takings Clause is not barred from extending abroad.63
Specifically,just because an American convicted in Japan without ajury lacked standing
to reverse a conviction due to denial of the right to a trial by jury, it did not "mean
that other constitutional rights, such as the right to just compensation for property
taken, which can, without inconvenience or practical difficulty, be applied to a taking
abroad, should not be so applied."' The argument is weak because it rests on the
twin pillars of convenience and absence of "practical difficulty. 65 For the United
States' treasury, cash is rarely a practical difficulty.
The Turney logic would be stronger if constructed more directly: some constitu-
tional rights extend abroad, so others should extend abroad for the same reason.'M Juris-
prudential arguments to overrule Turney ought to nullify the logic: a constitutional right
to just compensation ought not extend abroad for the same reason that other consti-
tutional rights do not extend abroad.67 Opponents of Turney employ this argument: a
constitutional right to just compensation ought not extend abroad because the Supreme
Court declines to extend other constitutional rights abroad. 68 Thus, one may refute
62 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-11, EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005) (No. 04-1291) (challenging the President's determination that the
underlying property was inimical to the United States).
63 115 F. Supp. at 464.
6 Id. (citing Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453 (1891)).
65 id.
66 The Supreme Court adopted this analogy in the seminal case Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (holding petitioner "alien friend" should enjoy Fifth
Amendment rights because he enjoys Fourth Amendment rights) (citing Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending access to writ of habeas corpus to domestic
aliens)). The Court used the same analogy in Wong Wing to extend the Fourteenth Amendment
to resident aliens in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at
238. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259-60 (1990) (holding an
alien lacking substantial connections to the United States has no Fourth Amendment protection).
67 This logic assumes that parts of the Constitution are similarly constituted.
68 See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 763 (2003) (noting
the Supreme Court declined to extend Fourth Amendment protections abroad); Ashkir v.
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the logic with doctrine concerning the extraterritorial scope of other constitutional
guarantees.
D. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez Lays the Groundwork to Refute
Turney's Logic
El-Shifa's attempt to shift the scope of constitutional rights abroad is part of a
larger debate over the extraterritoriality of other constitutional rights.69 United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez' fulfills the requirement to refute Turney's position. In Verdugo
-Urquidez, the Court denied Fourth Amendment protection to a search of an alien's
home on foreign soil." United States marshals worked with Mexican police to appre-
hend a leader of a comprehensive and violent narcotics network.72 Drug Enforcement
Administration agents entered and searched Verdugo-Urquidez' s home with permis-
sion from Mexico but without a warrant.73 The Court held "the Fourth Amendment has
no application" to a "citizen and resident of Mexico" in light of the "history, and our
cases discussing the application of the Constitution to aliens."7"
The Court found support in the text of the Fourth Amendment: grounding the right
in "the people to be secure"' rather than merely "people."'76 The Court distinguished
the Fourth Amendment from others, including the Fifth Amendment, because of this
qualification of the right applying to the people.77 The Court turned to the history of the
United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438,442-44 (2000) (declining to extend right to just compensation
abroad because the Supreme Court declined to extend Fourth Amendment protections
abroad). These two cases rely on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(holding an alien has no Fourth Amendment protection concerning search of foreign property).
But see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (extending writ of habeas corpus to non-resident,
enemy aliens because of unique history of the writ and statutory interpretation).
69 See, e.g., 8A-19 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 19.07 (2006) [hereinafter EMINENT
DOMAIN] (linking foreign takings debate to the larger constitutional stakes); Roszell Dulany
Hunter IV, Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Constitution-Unalienable Rights?,
72 VA. L. REV. 649 (1986).
70 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
"' Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 263. On this ground, the district court granted a motion to suppress incriminating
evidence uncovered by the search. Id.
74 Id. at 274-75.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
76 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (holding 'the people'
references "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community"
(emphasis added)). The dissenting justices would hold any person impacted by the laws of the
United States as part of "the people." Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This argument adopts
inherency theory of right. See infra Part II.C.
71 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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Fourth Amendment to support its holding that "the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Gov-
ernment; it was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions
of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States territory."7 8
The Court cautioned that the holding may not cross-apply to the Fifth Amendment
without friction because the it includes "a fundamental trial right of criminal defen-
dants."79 This qualification would not affect the Takings Clause because it does not
relate to a trial right of criminal defendants."0 By implication, the Court's holding
that the Fourth Amendment would not limit the United States' actions respecting aliens
in foreign territory would also inform the scope of other constitutional rights, such
as the Fifth Amendment entitlement to just compensation.8 ' This standard would
properly limit the extraterritorial scope of the Takings Clause.
Conversely, dissenting justices would have extended a right under the United States
Constitution to a citizen and resident of Mexico whose Mexican property was subjected
to criminal inquiry. 2 They founded their argument in a theory of "mutuality" and
reasoned that United States enforcement of its laws abroad without the accompany-
ing constitutional protections discourages foreign nations from respecting our laws. 3
Verdugo- Urquidez tees up the deeper controversy concerning the scope of extrater-
ritorial constitutional rights. The Court adopted a theory of substantial relations that
looked to the connection between the individual and the authority.' For example, in the
context of Turney, the relationship between the Filipino corporation and the United
States would have to have been substantial to warrant Fifth Amendment protection.
Verdugo- Urquidez thus established a foundation for crafting a broader theory of the
scope of constitutional rights, and it may also anchor the Takings Clause in a relation-
ship inquiry rather than an identity inquiry. 5
78 Id. at 266.
71 Id. at 264 (referencing the Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination).
80 See id. (noting the constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment is "fully accom-
plished" before trial (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974))).
81 But see EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 69, at § 19.07[3] (noting consistent trend of
lower courts granting just compensation for foreign takings).
82 "Today the Court holds that although foreign nationals must abide by our laws even
when in their own countries, our Government need not abide by the Fourth Amendment when
it investigates them for violations of our laws. I respectfully dissent." Verdugo- Urquidez, 494
U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 285-86.
8" See supra Part I.B.
85 See generally supra Part I. However, the Court implicitly reserved the Fifth Amend-
ment debate for a future time. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (suggesting textual analysis
is stronger for the Fourth Amendment than for the Fifth Amendment). But the Court reinforced
a prior case that ruled foreign aliens lack Fifth Amendment protection: Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950). Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 ("[O]ur rejection of extraterritorial
application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic .... "). It is not clear this analysis applies
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E. Verdugo-Urquidez's Refutation of Turney Is Deeply Rooted in Precedent
The Court in Verdugo- Urquidez rooted its holding in a deeper line ofjurisprudence:
the Insular Cases.86 This series of cases explored the scope of constitutional pro-
tections to people of lands under acquisition by the United States such as Puerto Rico,87
Philippines,88 and Hawaii.89 The Insular Cases withheld constitutional protections
to such lands absent an express congressional extension of rights. The Court compared
the limited protection extended to lands "ultimately governed by Congress," with
assertions by "aliens in foreign nations," and it concluded "it is not open to us in light
of the Insular Cases to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies
wherever the United States Government exercises its power."'
The Supreme Court in Verdugo-Urquidez9' also reinforced a prior holding that
bounded constitutional rights to the United States: Johnson v. Eisentrager.92 In
Eisentrager, the Supreme Court denied a writ of habeas corpus to an alien enemy
apprehended abroad.93 The Court recoiled at the implications of extending constitu-
tional rights to enemy aliens, requiring "the American Judiciary to assure [enemies]
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly ... right to bear arms. .. security against
'unreasonable' searches and seizures.., as well as rights to jury trial. .. ."" More
importantly for the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court noted if Fifth Amendment
jury trial rights applied to enemy aliens, "the same must be true of the companion civil-
to the Takings Clause because these cases only reference general Fifth Amendment due process.
86 Id. at 268; cf Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922) (referencing
jurisprudence concerning congressional extension of constitutional rights to the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, and Hawaii as the Insular Cases).
87 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304-05, 313 (1922) (holding the Sixth Amendment's provision
for a jury trial inapplicable to citizens of Puerto Rico because the Organic Act of Porto Rico
of 1917 did not extend such a trial right). The Court qualified its holding by distinguishing
"fundamental rights" and "grants of power and limitation," such that due process rights "had
from the beginning full application in... Porto Rico .... "Id. at 312-13; see also Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (plurality opinion) (holding Revenue Clauses of the
Constitution do not extend to Puerto Rico because it was a territory but not a state).
88 See Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 97-99 (1914) (declining to extend grand
jury provision to Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding a
right to jury trial does not extend to the Philippines by force of the Constitution alone).
89 See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) (declining to extend jury and
grand jury rights to Hawaii because such rights are not so fundamental as to activate at the
,'moment of annexation").
'o Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-69. This holding fundamentally rejects the
inherent theory of rights. See supra Part I.C.
91 Id. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
92 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
93 Id. at 784.
94 id.
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rights Amendments, for none of them is limited by its express terms ... ."' The Court
rebuked such broad constitutional scope as lacking a hint of support from any constitu-
tional commentators and as contrary to the "practice of every modem government., 96
Accordingly, the extraterritoriality of Fourth and Fifth Amendment due process
may guide the extraterritoriality for the Takings Clause by constitutional construction.
One qualification may be that personal liberty was at stake in Verdugo-Urquidez and
Eisentrager while compensation for property was at stake in Tumey and El-Shifa. Thus,
due process for liberty may extend to the world while due process for property may
be reserved. In spite of this hypothetical construct, Verdugo-Urquidez and Eisentrager
demonstrate how the Supreme Court pegs the scope of these rights to one another.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court narrowly changed its mind while daintily
distinguishing Eisentrager. Recently, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to
enemy aliens captured abroad.97 The Court excepted Eisentrager because the enemy
combatants detained in Cuba owed allegiance to no nation at war with the United
States and denied wrongdoing.9" The Court in Rasul v.Bush grounded its holding
on the special history of the writ of habeas corpus and the distinguishing facts of the
case.99 For purposes of this inquiry, Rasul' s criticism of Eisentrager does not bar
the analogy for the Fifth Amendment. The unique history of a writ of habeas corpus
is due to the stakes: personal liberty or imprisonment. Despite the narrow Rasul
exception, the Court's fundamental position about the scope of constitutional rights
in Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez stands: an alien lacking substantial connections
with the United States does not enjoy full constitutional protection.
In summary, Turney falls in a narrow category of controversies: aliens seeking
just compensation for foreign property outside the military necessity doctrine. The legal
grounds for extending standing to such petitioners are frail, especially when compared
to permitting enemy-alien collateral attack on the Executive's power. The Supreme
Court constrains the international scope of constitutional provisions, which cautions
against a far-flung cause of action for just compensation. At the next opportunity, an
appropriate tribunal should overrule Turney. In order to do so, such a court must
enter a theoretical debate.
IH. THE THEORETICAL STAKES
For an appropriate tribunal to overrule Turney, it must enter a subtler struggle. The
battle among philosophies of constitutional rights undergirds the legal debate overjust
compensation for foreign takings. Across the spectrum and history of such controver-
sies, three theories of rights struggle for preeminence: territorial, contract, and inherent.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 784-85.
97 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
98 Id. at 476.
99 Id. at 473-75.
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In order to overrule Tumey, an appropriate tribunal must rest its holding in a contractual
theory of right and no other.
A. Territorial Theory of Right
The territorial theory of right is the most ancient of the three theories because it
is rooted in notions of sovereignty in soil. " Under this theory, one's rights are claims
whose vitality extends as far as the physical soil of the sovereign authority. The claim
rises from the dirt rather than the claimant. If the claim involves property beyond the
territorial authority of the sovereign, the right extinguishes. Consequently, if a taking
occurs outside the United States, no claim forjust compensation is valid even if the
authority is the United States or the claimant is an American. In theory, this paradigm
would authorize just compensation for a domestic taking of alien property.
Figure 1, above, shows that a claimant's capacity to demand just compensation




Identity of Claimant mayClaimant ama claim
Claimant may
not assert a claim
Fig. 1: Territorial Theory of Right
States, the claimant may assert a claim whether the claimant is foreign or domestic,
loyal or inimical. Every margin is filled according to the identity of the dirt.
As illustrative, consider Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, in which Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote for the Court denying a claim for just compensation for military
seizure of sugar because it was the fruit of enemy soil.' A Danish citizen's agent
shipped the sugar from Santa Cruz to Great Britain by British transport during the
War of 1812.'0 The owner, a Dane, was not an enemy of the state, yet an American
100 See generally 2 THoMAs HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 167-76 (E.P. Dutton & Co., 1950) (noting
sovereignty extends with geographical scope of sovereign power); KARL MARX, The Fetishism
of Commodities and the Secret Thereof, in IDAs KAPrrAL 71-83 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel
Moore & Edward Aveling trans., International Publishers 1967) (1867) (human labor stamps
its quality literally into the thing as the commodity, changing its inherent character).
101 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 199 (1815).
"i Id. at 195.
20061
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
privateer seized the British ship.1 °3 The Court reasoned that "[w]hile that island [Santa
Cruz] belonged to Denmark, the produce of the soil, while unsold, was ... Danish
property, whatever might be the general character of the particular proprietor."' 4
Therefore, "[w]hen the island became British, the soil and its produce, while that
produce remained unsold, were British."'"5 The Court reasoned that although a Dane
owned the sugar, it was British sugar so long as Great Britain's sovereign authority
extended to the soil from which the sugar came." 6 The rights of an owner of property
peg to the sovereign whose authority governs that property. Territory is the measure of
the right.'0 7
Mrs. Perrin's Case,'0 8 another example, presented a similar story: an American
citizen stored her property in Nicaragua, and a United States sloop of war attacked
and destroyed the pirate cove Greytown, destroying Mrs. Perrin' s goods. " The ruling
denying just compensation was based on the principle that "one who takes up a
residence in a foreign place and there suffers an injury to his property by reason of
belligerent acts ... must abide the chances of the country in which he chose to
reside.... ."'" Mrs. Perrin's American citizenship did not avail her because her
property was in pirate dirt.
The Supreme Court outlined the justification behind this theory in The Prize Cases,
which involved claims for just compensation for cargo ships seized by a Union naval
blockade."' At issue was whether the neutrality of the cargo owner or hostility of
the cargo should govern the fate of the cargo." 2 The divided Court chose the latter:
[w]hether property be liable to capture as 'enemies property' does
not in any manner depend on the personal allegiance of the owner
.... The produce of the soil of the hostile territory. . . as the
103 Id.
'04 Id. at 197.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 199.
"o See the Insular Cases cited supra notes 86-89.
108 4 Ct. Cl. 543 (1868).
'09 Id. at 546-47.
1o Id. at 548-49.
". The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635,665-66 (1862). The Court started by assuming
that each ship was neutral. See id. at 665. Curiously, the ships each serviced the Confederacy
in the midst of the Civil War, and Chief Justice Taney (who authored an infamous decision
regarding fugitive slaves) dissented, ruling the owners should have restoration of the ship and
cargo. See id. at 698-99 (Nelson, J., dissenting); see also Young v. United States, 97 U.S.
39, 60 (1877) (affirming denial of just compensation to seized neutral ship because even
neutral property is assigned the allegiance of the enemy and is subject to seizure if it aids the
enemy); Green v. United States (Green's Case), 10 Ct. Cl. 466, 474 (1874) (denying just
compensation for affirmatively loyal citizen whose property was seized in enemy territory).
112 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666.
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source of its wealth and strength... are always regarded as legiti-
mate prize, without regard to the domicil[e] of the owner ... .113
As a matter of utility, property aids the enemy sufficiently to qualify for a military
necessity exception to just compensation. One can see how readily military necessity
doctrine emerges.
The United States Court of Claims elaborated on this "harsh" doctrine: in the
"stress of war" it is too difficult to discriminate between friendly and enemy property." 4
The court also cited an underlying theory of territoriality:
Property is considered to be necessarily hostile by its origin ....
Land... is necessarily associated with the permanent interests
of the State to which it belongs, and its proprietor, [is] so far from
being able to impress his own character, if it happens to be neutral
.... The produce of such property therefore is liable to capture
under all circumstances in which enemy's property can be seized." 5
So far, each takings example applying a territorial theory of right arises in a time of
war such that utility and the stress of war excuses the distinction between the loyalty of
the owner and the loyalty of the property.
The scope of this theory stretched when the Supreme Court turned to this theory
of right in extending due process protection to resident aliens because they lived in
United States territory." 6 Eventually, the Supreme Court repudiated this theory of
right when it extended due process protection to an American on trial outside of the
territorial United States." 7 Reid v. Covert stands for the proposition that wherever the
United States acts it is "entirely a creature of the Constitution" and may not evade
its limitations because the citizen is standing on different dirt."'
"13 Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
.. Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99, 112 (1907).
"' Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1.6 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending due process to
resident alien because "all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the
protection" (emphasis added)); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (extending
due process rights to resident alien because the rights "are universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction" (emphasis added)).
"' See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,5-6 (1957) (applying due process protections to citizen
tried by United States tribunal overseas); id. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting territorial
limitations on rights is "a notion that has long since evaporated").
118 Id. at 5-6; see also id. at 7 (applying principle to the Fifth Amendment, though not
specifically to the Takings Clause). But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
283-84 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing Fourth Amendment should extend to the search
of alien's foreign property because the alien is imprisoned and prosecuted on United States soil).
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If the United States Court of Claims operated according to a territorial theory
of right, the plaintiff in Turney would have failed to state a valid claim because both
the owner and the property were beyond the territory of the United States. The
court authored Turney four years before the Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
territorial theory of right in Reid."9
Curiously, the Court of Claims preceded its holding in Turney with some brief
notations mimicking a relationship-based theory of right: decisions granting just
compensation to a domestic, friendly alien and to an American citizen whose foreign
property was seized abroad. 2° This alternative, contract theory of right shifts focus
from where the property or person is to the relationship of the property or person
to the taking authority.
B. Contract Theory of Right
The contract theory of right modifies the territorial theory 2 ' by pegging a right
to the individual in a sufficient relationship to the taking authority. The relationship
between the parties creates the right.'22 The claim may arise in any soil so long as
the claimant is in privity with the authority. Under this theory, a taking effected outside
the United States would give rise to a valid claim for just compensation if the authority
is the United States and the owner is American. Likewise, a form of contract in fact
may arise between the United States and a resident alien. A claim forjust compensation
would be invalid if the authority is other than the United States or the owner is a non-
resident alien or enemy alien.
Figure 2, below, demonstrates variety in whether a claimant may assert a claim for
just compensation. The key is whether the relationship between the claimant and the
United States is sufficient to warrant the right. An American citizen's citizenship
would have such connections per se, regardless of whether the property is foreign or
"9 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 (applying due process protections to citizen tried by United
States tribunal overseas).
120 See Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (citing Russian
Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl.
412 (1867)).
.2. Chief Justice Marshall hinted at a connection between the territorial theory and contract
theory of right by reasoning "the proprietor has incorporated himself with the permanent
interests of the nation as a holder of the soil, and is to be taken as a part of that country...
independent of his own personal residence and occupation." Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 197 (1815) (emphasis added) (quoting Case of the Vrow
Anna Catharina).
122 See HOBBES, supra note 100, at 144-54; id. at 145 ("From this Institution of a Common-
wealth are derived all the Rights and [Faculties] of him, or them, on whom the [Sovereign]
Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled."); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIsEs
OF GOvERNMENT 331-32 (Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1690) (political
societies begin by consent of participants in compact to consent to that general will).
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domestic. Therefore, the margins in the figure are filled for the citizen, even if the
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Fig. 2: Contract Theory of Right
The alien may also establish sufficient connections, but it is easier to find such
connections when the property is located in the United States. An alien whose Ameri-
can home is seized would have a strong argument for substantial connections by virtue
of the property's location. The margins in the figure are not filled for an alien with
domestic property because in theory, if the domesticity of the property is the only
connection, a court may find insufficient connections.
It would be easier to find that an alien with domestic property has sufficient connec-
tions than an alien with foreign property. It would be difficult, but not impossible,
for an alien with foreign property to have sufficient connections to the taking authority.
The inquiry is theoretically consistent but ad hoc and fact specific in application.
The territorial theory of right concurs with the contract theory of right concerning
claims by domestic people or concerning domestic property. The contract theory adds
the option of extending rights to citizens and property abroad. Although the citizen
leaves the territory or owns foreign property, the relationship with the taking authority
does not change. There is no magic in the dirt but rather in the association.
Proponents of the contract theory of right include the first Chief Justice of the
United States, who held in Chisholm v. Georgia that "the Con[s]titution of the
United States is... a compact made by the people of the United States to govern
them[s]elves . ,,*"3 Chief Justice John Marshall read the Constitution similarly in
McCulloch v. Maryland, stating that "[t]he government of the Union... is, emphatically
and truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for
their benefit."' 24 By implication, the parties to the Constitution, "[w]e the People,' 125
123 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,471 (1793) (second emphasis added), superceded by U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
124 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,404-05 (1819) (emphasis added).
125 U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
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due to their relationship to their government, were granted protections in exchange
for submission. James Madison also proffered this contract theory as justification
for protecting domestic aliens under the Constitution. '26 Madison was not alone, for
the compact theory of the Constitution was widespread among the Founders 27 and
explicitly implemented in the judiciary. 128
Some early controversies where courts followed this theory of right include grant-
ing a claim for just compensation for the United States military occupying an Austrian
home for an officer's recreational club,' 29 granting a similar claim for property destruc-
tion abroad during military engagement,'30 and extending due process rights to citizens
tried abroad.' 3
126 It does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the Constitution...
that, whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its pro-
tection. Aliens are not more parties to the laws than they are parties to
the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one
hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their pro-
tection and advantage.
MADISON'S REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1800), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556
(photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). This excerpt supports a form of
contract in fact between the domestic alien and the government. See also THE FEDERALIST
No. 48, at 297 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (defending the Constitution as
a "compact" including "[tihe principle of reciprocality"). But see Hunter, supra note 69, at
672) (criticizing this reading of founding history as "a sophistic extension of the metaphor
[that] does violence to their work").
127 See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 224-65 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1987)
(1833); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2550-51 (2005)
(arguing the Constitution should be internationalized while acknowledging this departs from
the Founders' understanding of a compact theory).
128 Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REv. 1,5-7
(1999) (showing the judicial use of social contract analysis for sundry laws such as sover-
eignty questions, slavery, negligence, property, criminal procedure, and others); see also Paul
B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20
VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 785 (1980) ("A great deal of history lies behind the idea that the
Constitution, above all, embodies a series of reciprocal obligations between the people of this
country and their government. Extending rights to aliens, to individuals who are not parties
to the compact between the federal government and its people, is contrary to this tradition
and should be rejected unless it can be said that, by doing so, substantial benefits would inure
to U.S. citizens.").
129 See Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
130 See Wiggins v. United States (The Wiggins's Case), 3 Ct. Cl. 412,422 (1867). But see
Mrs. Perrin's Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 543,548-49 (1868) (denying just compensation for same circum-
stances as The Wiggins's Case because of military necessity doctrine).
'3' Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
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The contract theory of right often emerges when an alien's associations with the
United States become substantial enough to warrant the extension of constitutional
rights, like an implied contract. 132 For example, the Supreme Court declined to extend
Fifth Amendment protection to non-resident aliens 133 while contemplating that "[t]he
alien.., has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases
his identity with our society.... [L]awful presence in the country creates an implied
assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights .... "'
More recently, the Supreme Court declined to extend Fourth Amendment rights
to an alien lacking any "voluntary connection with this country that might place him
among 'the people' of the United States."'13' The Court adopted the lower court's
dissenting opinion that viewed "the Constitution as a 'compact' among the people
of the United States, and the protections.., expressly limited to 'the people.""
136
If the United States Court of Claims had adopted the contract theory of right in
Turney, it would have rejected the claim for just compensation because the owner,
a foreign corporation, 37 lacked any association with the United States outside of the
132 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950) ("We have pointed out that the
privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because
permitting their presence in the country implied protection." (emphasis added)); see Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (granting habeas corpus protection to
resident alien who established sufficient voluntary connections to the United States) ("It is
well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains
physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment."); see
also id. at 596 n.5 ("The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking [initial]
admission.... But once an alien lawfully... resides in this country he becomes invested
with [constitutional] rights guaranteed... all people within our borders." (quoting Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring))).
' Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763. But see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (extending
habeas corpus protection to Taliban prisoners captured during the War on Terror due to its
special history and a statutory exception to Eisentrager).
'34 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added). Note an overlap in the rhetoric between
contract and territorial theory in that presence in the territory causes an implied contract: "the
Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial
jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act." Id. at 771 (emphasis added); see also id.
(extending analysis to "property rights of immigrants or transients of foreign nationality").
135 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (emphasis added).
136 Id. at 264 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir.
1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), rev'd, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990)). But see id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting a contract theory of the
Constitution); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens .... ). See generally United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1231-37 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (exploring
history and text of the Constitution to sustain a contract theory of rights), rev'd, United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
137 Tumey v. United States 115 F. Supp. 457, 459 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
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original sale, which expressly disclaimed warranty.1 3 8 The property was also located
abroad and was under foreign control. The original sales contract did not expressly
or implicitly incorporate the Takings Clause. The final theory of right, however,
would counsel otherwise: since the United States cannot act but by the inherent
limitations in the Constitution, the Takings Clause would fully apply to the foreign
corporation even absent association.
C. The Inherent Theory of Right
The inherent theory of constitutional rights unites two viewpoints: a fundamen-
tal rights viewpoint, which attaches the right to all people, and a bound sovereignty
viewpoint, which asserts that the sovereign lacks the power to act beyond its foundation.
In other words, either the right is inherent or the sovereign limitation is inherent. The
presence of the right does not flex with the claimant's relationship to the authority, nor





IdentityOf assert a claim
Al-e Claimant may
Alien I not assert a claim
Fig. 3: Inherent Theory of Right
Figure 3 demonstrates that neither axis controls the claimant's standing to assert
a claim. The most alien claimant, loyal or inimical, may assert a claim if the taking
authority was involved. This claim stands whether the property is foreign or domestic.
The inquiry is simple: if the taking authority acted, it must give just compensation.
Every margin is filled, even the enemy alien with hostile property.
This theory would grant a claim for just compensation to any claimant whose
property the United States seized, whether or not the claimant or property is American.
The only relevant question is whether the United States took the property. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confessed this consequence when
reviewing a foreign taking: "When considering a possible taking, the focus is not
on the acts of others, but on whether sufficient direct and substantial United States
involvement exists."' 39
131 Id. (underlying contract sold the property "as is" and without any warranty of guarantee).
139 Langeneggerv. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted),
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A prominent proponent of the inherent theory was Thomas Jefferson, who wrote
of "unalienable Rights... among [which] are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happi-
ness.' ° Since such rights are so "endowed by their Creator" and "unalienable," no au-
thority except that Creator could trespass against them. 4' Though Jefferson may have
been the most strident proponent of inherent theory, these fundamental rights were qual-
ified for women and slaves. They were more fundamental for some than for the rest.
42
In a strikingly transparent adoption of inherent theory, the United States Claims
Court granted just compensation to inhabitants of the Marshall Islands when the United
States used the islands for nuclear testing. 43 A fluke of the case was that Congress
had nearly adopted a contract that would have squarely shifted the case into a contract
theory of right,'" but instead the court adopted an inherent theory. At oral argument,
counsel for the United States persuaded the court that the Takings Clause does not
extend to aliens asserting rights over foreign property. 45 The court reversed course"4
and adopted inherent theory rhetoric to grant just compensation: "All of the restraints
of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the United States wherever it has acted.'
147
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985). The court authored a two-part test for this question: "the
nature of the United States' activity, and... the level of the benefit the United States has
derived." Id. at 1572; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 711(c) (1987) ("A state is responsible... for injury to a national of another
state caused by an official act or omission that violates .. a right to property or another
economic interest that.., a state is obligated to respect for persons. .. ."). But see id. at §
71 l(c) cmt. d (supporting right to damages for "arbitrar[y] depriv[ation] of his property" but
noting disagreement about the scope of international constitutional protection).
140 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Although Jefferson did not
specifically include property, the Constitution did. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
141 But see U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (authorizing violation of life, liberty, and
property so long as due process of law precedes the violation).
112 Even the most strident advocates of an inherent theory of right must concede that the
Constitution implicitly authorizes violations of fundamental rights, such as life, liberty, and
property, so long as the violations succeed due process. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
At the margin, the inherent theory must concede that fundamental rights are not so inherent
and the sovereign is not so bound. Cf. Turney, 115 F. Supp. at 464 (adopting a novel
convenience doctrine).
141 Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441, 458 (1984).
" Id. at 445 (pending contract would have granted full compensation for property and
relocation resulting from nuclear testing).
141 Id. at 458 ("At the conclusion of oral argument counsel were advised that defendant's
motion to dismiss probably would be allowed as to the taking claims on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.").
"4 See id. ("Further reflection and review of applicable precedent has changed that tentative
conclusion.").
" Id. (emphasis added). Pushing the doctrine even further, the court disclaimed any
reliance on degrees of the fundamental nature between rights: "There is no suggestion that the
protections of the just compensation clause... are any less 'fundamental' than the other pro-
tections ..... Id.; c Gasser v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 476, 476 n.1 (1988) (granting just
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Additionally, the court implied an inherent theory of right was proper merely because
it was the 1980s.14 The United States Court of Claims has also read cases like Tumey
as merely a question of whether the United States was the taking authority. "'
The Supreme Court parted from the territorial theory of right by granting due pro-
cess protection to citizens abroad butjustified the departure under an inherent theory
of right. 5' The Court held the government is "entirely a creature of the Constitution."''
The holding applied to citizens abroad, but the rhetoric went further: any time the
United States acts, it cannot help but act subject to its circumscribed sovereignty.
The Supreme Court recently struggled between contract and inherent theory in
Verdugo-Urquidez, in which dissenting justices adopted inherent theory by holding
the "focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and cannot do,
and how it may act, not on against whom these actions may be taken."'52 Ultimately,
the Court rejected inherency theory: "it is not open to use in light of the Insular Cases
to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United
States Government exercises its power."' 53
One complication of inherent theory is whether all rights are fundamental and
whether all limits on government are inherent or if only some of each are inherent.
Even the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez left room for the possibility that the Fourth
Amendment might be contract based, applying to "the people"' construed as Ameri-
cans, but the broad term "persons"' 55 might extend further.'56
compensation for Mexican property flooded by United States action to the Colorado River and
holding arguments disclaiming foreign takings "required further factual inquiry"), withdrawn,
22 Cl. Ct. 165 (1990) (parties settled for just compensation).
141 Juda, 6 Cl. Ct. at 458. Evidently the fundamental nature of the Constitution changes
with the seasons, which suggests it is not fundamental at all. One wonders what, exactly, we
constituted in 1789. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's
Principle (U. Chicago, Pub. Law Working Paper No. 09, 2006), available at http://papers
.ssrn.compaper.taf?abstractid=224285.
141 See Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 591 (Ct. CI. 1974) ("A key element of these
precedents, however, is that each concerned an alleged taking by the United States, regardless
of where the property was located. Thus, in the present case... they must show the United
States carried out the alleged taking of property.").
5 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
' Id. at 5-6; see id. at 7 (applying principle to Fifth Amendment due process though not
to the Takings Clause). The Court rooted its philosophy in ancient history, citing Paul's
assertion of rights as a Roman citizen. Id. at 6. Of course, Paul asserted this right in Roman
territory and before a Roman judge. See Acts 22:22-29, 25:1-12.
152 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan also read the Ninth Amendment to presume preexisting rights. Id.
I53 d. at 268-69.
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see also id. at amends. IX, X, and XIV, § 1.
I d. at amend. V.
156 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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One problem with varying the applicability of rights in this way is that the Court
must author a rights hierarchy in which some rights are more fundamental than others.5 7
A rights hierarchy refutes the underlying premise of an inherent theory: if rights are
fundamental or sovereign bounds are set, how may rights be sometimes fundamental
or sovereign bounds be sometimes set? A hierarchy qualification to inherency theory
reduces to ad hoc fundamentals-a contradiction. At that point, inherent theory is
a red herring for judicial whim.
Strict inherency theory would award just compensation to enemies of the state.
If the sole question is whether the United States acted, then if the United States acts
on enemies, the same constitutional protections would apply.'58 Likewise, military
necessity doctrine is inimical to inherent theory because it qualifies that which is
inherent. By definition, the doctrine is firm: if the United States acts, it is always
subject to the Constitution, or if a human being is involved, all fundamental rights are
in play. Inherent theory must, therefore, overrule military necessity. 159
The inherent theory of right is the only framework that justifies granting just com-
pensation to aliens for foreign property. If the property and alien are beyond the United
States, the territorial theory declines just compensation. If the alien and property lack
association with the United States, the contract theory declines just compensation.
But if the United States took the alien's property, the inherent theory grants just compen-
sation. The petitioners in Turney and EI-Shifa could find no more comforting a theory
of right than one making them third party beneficiaries to the United States Constitution.
Therefore, if a court reverses Turney, it must likewise reject inherent theory of right.
D. The Contract Theory of Right Is Superior to Either Alternative
For the jurist desiring to hybridize consistency with flexibility, an ad hoc approach
is preferable. The only theory of right conforming to this preference is the contract
theory of right because for the right to accrue, a court must find an association. A
court is invited to examine the relationship between the claimant and the authority,
the surrounding circumstances, and the equities. In contrast, ajurist adopting either
a territorial theory or inherent theory has already decided a controversy's equities:
157 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[W]hich specific
safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context overseas
can be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due' a defendant in the particular circumstances
of a particular case.").
15' See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-72 (2004) (granting due process rights to
Taliban enemies captured during the War on Terror). The Court adopts an inherent theory
view of habeas corpus because it "does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon
the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody... ." Id. at 478 (quoting
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973)). Just like
inherent theory fundamentals, the only relevant question is whether the authority acted.
9 This is the goal of some inherency theory disciples. See infra Part III.A.
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for each, a single question is dispositive, but neither is satisfactory. One theory would
betray cosmopolitan citizens and the other would capitulate to enemies.
The most strident territorial disciple would make room for military necessity,
and the most flamboyant inherent theory acolyte would turn away at the necessary
conclusion of treating the enemy as the friend. The more moderate approach is the
contract theory of right. The notion of consent by the governed favors a relation-
ship inquiry between the authority and the claimant. Likewise, a charter of negative
liberties implies mutuality and bilateral sacrifice like a social contract. Finally, the
contract theory avoids the consequence of adopting an inherent theory of right: alien
collateral review of war powers.
Ill. THE PoLITcAL STAKES AND THE REAL STORY
Legal and theoretical justifications for overruling Turney may be persuasive, but
the political stakes at hand breathe oxygen into the flame. It is far easier for an adver-
sary of the United States to defeat it in court than on the battlefield. It is also far easier
for a domestic adversary to defeat a proposal by judicial decree than convince the sover-
eign electorate to alter governance. How tempting an international Constitution
would be to a foreign enemy lacking an army of troops but wielding a vanguard of
lawyers."t° The inherent theory of right embraces this consequence.
Petitioner in El-Shifa tapped into jurisprudence expanding the scope of constitu-
tional rights beyond citizenship.'6 ' In the petition for a writ of certiorari counsel for
E1-Shifa sought to position the lower court's decision in El-Shifa as contrary to Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, a recent Supreme Court decision holding "threats to military operations
posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a
citizen's core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government's case and to be
heard by an impartial adjudicator."' 62 El-Shifa sought adjudication of the President's
"6o See Saddam to Sue Bush and Blair, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.uruknet
.info/?p=19926 (noting Saddam Hussein's attorneys distributed copies of a complaint alleging
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair illegally used weapons of mass destruction against
Iraq, "torturing Iraqi prisoners, destroying Iraq's culture heritage.., inciting internal strife
[and] polluting Iraq's air, waters[,] and environment").
161 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-8, El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 125
S. Ct. 2963 (2005) (No. 04-1291) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)).
162 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. The Court cautioned district courts about the balance between
the national security interests of the nation and the citizen's interest in fundamental rights:
We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that
we have indicated is necessary in this setting, engaging in a factfinding
process that is both prudent and incremental. We have no reason to doubt
that courts faced with these sensitive matters will pay proper heed both
to the matters of national security that might arise in an individual case
and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that
remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.
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declaration of property as enemy property 163 just as Hamdi granted "a basic system of
independent review."'(' In essence, El-Shifa wanted a court to hold the President's
military designation of enemy property was wrong in fact.165
Hamdi was tightly rooted in the fundamental habeas corpus rights of a citizen'"
even though the citizen in question joined an enemy force at war with his nation.'67
Admittedly, counsel for El-Shifa had quite a hill to climb connecting Hamdi to El-
Shifa given how rooted the former was in a citizen's constitutional rights. But the
argument illustrates potential consequences of the open door that Turney and
inherent theory of right created.
A. Academic Commentators Tend to Favor Internationalizing the Constitution
Another element to the back story is a growing academic objection to United States
power, influence, and sovereignty. Such academic objections seek to internationalize
the Constitution. 16 Such critics argue the Constitution should be internationalized
because the United States is often a bad actor and needs external checks. 69 More
Id. at 538-39. The Court allowed the possibility of military tribunal review serving this
process unless no such "appropriately authorized and properly constituted" tribunal exists.
Id. at 538 (plurality opinion).
163 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, EI-Shifa Pharm. Ind. Co. v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
2963 (2005) (No. 04-1291); see also E1-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d
1346, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining to accept plaintiff's demand that the court second-guess
the President's discrete war power decision), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2963 (2005).
,64 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
65 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 125
S. Ct. 2963 (2005) (No. 04-1291) ('Thus, a valid takings claim may arise out of the destruction
of property by military operations only in the presumably rare circumstance in which private
property of a non-enemy located in a country at peace with the United States is openly and
deliberately destroyed by military forces that are not responding to an imminent danger.").
'66 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527-35. At the beginning of the section, the Court noted the
"extraordinary constitutional interests at stake." Id. at 527.
167 Id. at 519 (plurality opinion). After defining the scope of enemy combatant status, the
Court found that the government's allegations against Hamdi did not rise to the level of
affirmative actions of war against the United States. Id. at 526-27.
'68 See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 127, at 2558-59 (constitutional rights should be
international because "American officials frequently engage in criminal justice and regulatory
activities beyond our borders."); Hunter, supra note 72, at 649 ("Since World War II, however,
the United States has assumed the role of a world leader and has acquired massive overseas
commitments. These foreign involvements require an answer to the question of what restraints
the United States government must observe when acting abroad."); Remsen M. Kinne IV, Note,
Making America Pay: Just Compensation for Foreign Property Takings, 9 B.C. THIRD WoRLD
L.J. 217, 247 (1989) (arguing foreign takings authorize protection against "an interventionist
American foreign policy").
169 See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) ('The increasingly unilateral and
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subtly, commentators suggest the Constitution should be internationalized because we
live in a more modem time-implicitly, we ought to be less barbaric170 than those
living in the pre-modem times, like our Founders. 7 ' When such commentators are
confronted with contract theory like in Verdugo-Urquidez, some respond with simple
incredulity. 7 2 Critics ground their arguments in inherent theory in either form: natural
rights 73 or the theory that the Constitution universally binds the government. '7 4
aggressive character of United States foreign policy should heighten concern about the
application of American law to foreign defendants."); C. M. A. McCauliff, The Reach of the
Constitution: American Peace-time Court in West Berlin, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 682,
706-07 (1980) ("As the presence of the United States is more frequently felt abroad, it will
become increasingly necessary to have standards against which to measure the conduct of
United States officials toward.., any individual persons or governmental entities over which
United States sovereignty is exercised.").
170 Mark Gibney, Policing the World: The Long Reach of U.S. Law and the Short Arm of
the Constitution, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103, 126 (1990) (A domestic Constitution "is a
comfortable vision of the world, comfortable for us at least, but it is an unjust one as well.
It simply considers our own interests, but not the interests of others.").
171 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, supra note 127, at 2559 ("Twenty-first-century courts need to
think functionally, not formalistically, about spatial scope of the restraints on government power
...."); id. at 2550-51 (arguing the Constitution should be internationalized while acknowl-
edging this departs from the Founders' understanding of a compact theory); Jonathan Turley,
Legal Theory: "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 598, 660 (1990) ("[T]he presumption on extraterri-
toriality would be reflective of the world as it is at the dawn of the twenty-first, not the
twentieth, century."); id. at 603 (internationalizing the Constitution would "bring the extra-
territoriality presumption into conformity with the contemporary realities of the world
economy and environment in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century"); cf Juda v.
United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441,458 (1984) (justifying an international constitutional application
merely because it was the 1980s). Curiously, the European Union is not as interested as
American commentators in adopting an inherency theory of right. See Hugh Williamson, EU
Six Consider Introduction of "Integration Contracts" for Migrants, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 24,2006, at 8 (Germany, Britain, France, Poland, Spain, and Italy seek to bind immigrants
by contract to adopt the host nation's "social norms--or risk being expelled").
172 See Gibney, supra note 170, at 114 (arguing Rehnquist's language in Verdugo-
Urquidez "cannot be taken literally").
173 See, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Con-
stitutional Limitations to FederalAction, N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 287, 297 (1985) ("[T]he
Bill of Rights was conceived not as a grant of rights, but as a proclamation of rights that
inhered in each person. The Bill of Rights, accordingly, was drafted in universal language."
(citations omitted)); Hunter, supra note 69, at 673 ("[T]he natural rights theme ... argues for
extend[ed] protections to all individuals.").
174 See, e.g., Ragosta, supra note 173, at 293-94 ("In applying the Constitution abroad,
however, it is always a U.S. citizen-a government official-who is being controlled by the
Constitution."); Hunter, supra note 69, at 650 ("[C]onstitutional protection from United
States government conduct [should] be extended to all persons, at home and abroad.");
Kinne, supra note 168, at 231-32 (advocating "uniform just compensation protections" to
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The refutation of inherent theory above attacks its application at the margin: to
foreign enemies, which is the logical consequence of inherent theory. However, if one
objects to American sovereignty, power, or influence, one may not recoil at protecting
an enemy of the state because the interest of the commentator and the enemy coincide:
frustrating American foreign behavior.
One bold commentator vehemently argues for the superiority of the contract theory
of right over inherency theory: Paul Stephan.'75 He refutes inherent theory as applied.
The "real predicate" for the right arising in this context is action on alien soil: "the right
does not exist unless the court determines the government acted unacceptably over-
seas."'17 6 But American courts are improperly situated to assess the validity of foreign
behavior in contrast to the political branches.'77 When the United States acts within a
hostile country, "irregular conduct may be the only way of protecting U.S. interests." '178
Judicial second-guessing of the political branches' foreign behavior is costly.
Political branches lose a significant bargaining chip in international relations: negotia-
ting rules of international norms through practice or treaty.'79 If the judiciary imposes
a set way of international conduct on the United States, it cannot reward or punish
third parties for international conduct. International contract is superior to judicial
norm because it is tailored to the parties at hand rather than discovered in two-hundred-
year-old penumbrae. 8 '
The consequences of an international Constitution, particularly an international
Takings Clause, are unacceptable:
Those citizens of North Vietnam who suffered risk of a "taking"
of "life" without "due process" during the bombing of that country
could have sought an injunction against the raids based on the fifth
amendment, and survivors of those killed now could seek damages
against our government. Those Iranians who were temporarily de-
tained in the desert during the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the
U.S. hostages could sue for violations of their fourth amendment
rights. Foreign leaders everywhere could seek to enjoin the surveil-
lance of their actions by U.S. intelligence services.' 8 '
aliens abroad).
17 Stephan, supra note 128, at 777.
176 Id. at 788.
177 Id.; see also id. at 789 (criticizing the institutional disability of judges to conform
extraterritorial application of the Constitution); id. at 784 ("Often the government acts
overseas to protect the interests of the United States, as when it apprehends a terrorist ....
Judicial barriers would impede and perhaps inhibit these efforts.").
178 Id. at 784.
'79 Id. at 784-85.
80 See id. at 789.
18' Id. at 786.
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Paul Stephan envisioned an international Constitution would lead enemies to "enlist
the aid of our courts in attacking government misconduct."' 2 Such litigants would
enjoy "interest from the date of the taking to the date of payment, and to attorneys' fees
and other litigation costs, including the cost of expert witnesses."' 3 Stephan could
not have envisioned the international scope of asymmetrical warfare after the Cold
War, but this Age of Terror even draws thejudiciary into the battle field. Therefore, an
international Constitution becomes a way for enemies to exercise collateral attack
on American war-making power.
B. An International Constitution Is Unreasonable in an Age of Terror
Judicial tribunals may be exploited even if they are well intentioned for the ends
of justice. As a contemporary example, consider the pending trial of Saddam Hussein.
Saddam Hussein attracts lawyers from across the globe" to aid his defense against war
crimes charges.8 5 His legal supporters share the goal of using the trial as a means of
disputing and disrupting the United States' War on Terror.'86 Under this goal, the trial
drifts from a pursuit of justice to an alternative theater in this war on terror.
Ramsey Clark, President Johnson's Attorney General, is among the best known
of the lawyers aiding Hussein, motivated by his strong belief in the criminality of
the United States against "President" Hussein.'87 Attorneys like Clark desire to tackle
the United States in such tribunals because of personal offense at foreign policy. 88
Clark combines this legal advocacy with political advocacy against the United States,'89
including aiding international anti-war activists. 9°
182 id.
183 EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 69, at § 19.0713] (citations omitted).
'" See Farnaz Fassihi, Judgment Day: Hussein's Lawyers Aim to Focus Trial on U.S.
Occupation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at Al (referencing hundreds of lawyers from the
United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Japan, Malaysia, Libya, Jordan, Yemen, and Sudan
lending aid). French and Algerian lawyers also lend Hussein legal aid as part of 2,000 volunteer
lawyers. See Richard Boudreaux & Henry Winstein, Hussein Defense in Chaos as Trial Nears,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at Al.
185 See Fassihi, supra note 184, at Al.
'86 See id. (citing Professor Michael Scharf of Case Western Reserve University who
helped train the judges for the trial).
..7 Ramsey Clark, Why I'm Willing to Defend Hussein, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at B9
(The tribunal ought to have "the power and the mandate to consider charges against leaders
and military personnel of the U[nited] S[tates], Britain and the other nations that participated
in the aggression against Iraq .... [T]he days of victor's justice must end."). Clark endorses
impeaching President Bush. See Michael Janofsky, Antiwar Rallies Staged in Washington
and Other Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at 26.
18I Id.; see also Fassihi, supra note 184, at Al.
189 Clark delivered an address before ANSWER, an anti-war organization. See Janofsky,
supra note 187, at 26.
"g See Michael Betsch, Bush, US Naval Base Targeted by Anti-War Group, CNSNEwS
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More troubling than former attorney generals seekingjudicial tribunals and con-
troversies to advance a political end is al-Qaeda's efforts to do the same. Al-Qaeda
affirmatively trains its militant Islamic brothers to exploit the judicial resources of the
West in their international jihad."9' Islamic jihad brothers are instructed to accuse
interrogation authority of torture "whether or not he has injuries."' 92 Congressional
testimony confirms al-Qaeda's goal to "exploit our judicial process for the success
of their operations."' 93 Exploiting our judiciary is part of the overall goal to "use
America's freedom as a weapon against us."' 94 When our military enemy is "an
amorphous federation of geographically dispersed, fanatical cells rather than a nation-
state,"'95 the judiciary is as susceptible to turning into a battle ground as any other
forum.
If the judiciary was once insulated from the vicissitudes of peripheral affairs,
which is doubtful, it cannot claim to be so now. Lawyers, politicians, and, now,
enemies of the state deliberately target the judiciary as a front in an international
struggle. The role of the judiciary in governance ought not be discounted, but it is
poorly situated to handle incoming litigation seeking to collaterally attack executive
power for every adverse foreign influence on property. The political stakes for
Turney' s doctrine of international expansion is too costly to remain convenient. It
must be reversed.
.COM, Jan. 9, 2003, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPentagon.asp?Page=//Pentagon//archive
\\200301\\PEN20030109a.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
191 See Bin Laden's Terrorism Bible, The Smoking Gun, http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
archive/jihadmanual.html (UK/BM trans.) (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) [hereinafter JIHAD
MANUAL]. In United States v. Bin Laden, the court partially granted Osama bin Laden and
Ayman Al Zawahiri's motion to suppress evidence acquired during interrogation abroad by
providing the protection of the Fifth Amendment. 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The
tenor of the subsequent history changed after September of that year. For criticism of Bin
Laden, see generally Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier-The InternationalArena:
A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda
Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002).
192 JIHAD MANUAL, supra note 191, at 30 (instructing the brother to insist on seeing a
medical examiner and on entering notation of torture in the report of the interrogation). The
manual also instructs brothers to allege torture, deny all prior statements, and demand the inter-
rogation be quashed during prosecution regardless of what actually happened at interrogation.
Id. at 30; see also Rowan Scarborough, Captives Told to Claim Torture, WASH. TIMES, May
31,2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050531-121655-7932r.htm
(viewed Nov. 11, 2005) ("An al Qaeda handbook preaches to operatives to level charges of
torture once captured, a training regime that administration officials say explains some of the
charges of abuse at the Guantanamo Bay prison camp.").
193 John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee (Dec. 6,2001), http://www.usdoj.archive/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenate
judiciarycommittee.htm.
194 id.
' Ross J. HIleb, Colonel, USMC, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at A13.
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CONCLUSION
El-Shifa is, after all, merely a takings claim that the court dismissed as non-
justiciable in lieu of second guessing executive declarations of military necessity,
but the argument at stake in the controversy sought to hamstring United States sover-
eign power. Some of the arguments above apply to internationalizing other parts
of the Constitution, but their thrust applies to the Takings Clause, particularly in foreign
military activity. The costs of an international Constitution are high with an interna-
tional Takings Clause. Such a radical shift requires adopting an inherent theory of
constitutional rights, which, if followed to its logical end, would frustrate American
foreign behavior. For commentators seeking to truncate American sovereignty, or
for enemies seeking to defeat America, this is good news. Despite El-Shifa's loss, this
debate is not resolved; it is imminent. 196
El-Shifa managed to breach the barriers the contract theory of rights creates.
The controversy approached using a takings claim in federal court as collateral
review of executive war powers. El-Shifa's counsel sought to pair judicial review
of enemy combatants with judicial review of enemy property, piercing the military
necessity doctrine. At worst, a foreign enemy could further this work and use our
judiciary as a means of prosecuting a theater of an asymmetrical jihad. The legal,
theoretical, and political arguments warrant reversal of Turney to close off the
judiciary to such litigants because the Fifth Amendment ought not grant such
litigants constitutional entitlements.
196 EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 69, at § 19.07[3] (noting the "undoubted[] ... further
litigation to come in this developing area of foreign takings").
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INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST AND SECOND ANNUAL
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCES
On November 5-6, 2004, the William & Mary School of Law inaugurated the
annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference to inquire into pressing Ameri-
can legal questions surrounding property rights. The conference is named after Toby
Prince Brigham, a founding partner of Brigham Moore, LLP, and Professor Emeritus
Gideon Kanner of Loyola Law School.
I. THE 2004 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE
The inaugural conference awarded Professor Frank I. Michelman of Harvard Law
School with the Brigham-Kanner Prize. Professor Michelman's influential article
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law,' criticized the fairness of compensation practices, specifically
challenging the administrative and legislative agencies' tendency to fall short of their
responsibilities to give just compensation following takings for public use. Professor
Michelman has also published prolifically on property law, constitutional law, and
legal theory.
In this issue, the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal presents the following





Nuance and Complexity in Regulatory Takings Law
Gregory M. Stein
In addition to these authors, the following participants lent their expertise at the con-
ference: The Honorable Jonathan M. Apgar, Roanoke City Circuit Court; The Honor-
able Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; The Honorable
Rebecca Beach Smith, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia; Tobey
Prince Brigham, Brigham Moore, LLP; James S. Burling, Institute for Justice; Timothy
J. Dowling, Community Rights; Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School
of Law; William A. Fischel, Dartmouth College; Eric A. Kades, William & Mary
School of Law; Gideon Kanner, Loyola Law School; Richard J. Lazarus, George-
town University Law Center; Daniel R. Mandelker, Washington University in St. Louis
School of Law; and Ronald H. Rosenberg, William & Mary School of Law.
80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
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If. THE 2005 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE
The William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal is also proud to publish pieces from
the second annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, which occurred on
October 28-29, 2005, at the William & Mary School of Law and was co-sponsored
by the William & Mary Property Rights Project and the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
Professor Richard A. Epstein of the University of Chicago Law School was
awarded the 2005 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize. Professor Epstein is the
director of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics and has vigorously
contributed work in a wide range of legal debates, drawing citation by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In this issue, the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal presents the following
written contributions to the conference:
Taking Stock of Takings: An Author's Retrospective
Richard A. Epstein
Impact of Richard A. Epstein
James W. Ely, Jr.
Reconstructing Richard Epstein
Eduardo M. Pefialver
Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective
Eric R. Claeys
In addition to these published scholars, the following scholars served as panelists at
the conference: Robert W. Ashbrook, Dechert, LLP; Vicki L. Been, New York Univer-
sity School of Law; Dana Berling, Institute for Justice; M. Timothy Iglesias, Univer-
sity of San Francisco School of Law; Eric A. Kades, William & Mary School of Law;
Bradley C. Karkkainen, University of Minnesota Law School; S. William Moore,
Brigham Moore, LLP; Mark Tunick, Florida Atlantic University; and Joseph T.
Waldo, Waldo & Lyle, PC.
The William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal is driven to publish innovative, timely,
and artful pieces that substantially contribute to the development of constitutional
law. We trust these eminent ensembles provoke subsequent debate in the legal com-
munity to advance this development, especially in property rights. We are grateful
to the participants for their additions to these ongoing discussions, particularly the
authors of the articles included in this issue. We hope publication of these conferences




Frank Michelman, the theorist, is a figure known to judges and legal scholars
literally around the world. Michelman' s wildly successfully 1967 HarvardLaw Review
article, Property, Utility, and Fairness, invented the economic model of takings that
is now the starting point for every economic analysis of the takings issue.' The same
article is simultaneously the origin of a mode of analyzing takings disputes based
upon a Rawlsian theory of fairness.2 I can think of no other legal topic in which
virtually the entire theoretical landscape was not simply described, but created by, a
single piece of scholarship.
Michelman's subsequent writings on takings, such as, to pick only three examples,
the magnificent 1987 Iowa Law Review article, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property;3 his keynote article in the 1988 Columbia Law Review
symposium;4 and his 1993 William & Mary Law Review comment on Lucas,5 are simi-
lar examples of high legal theory at its very best. To put it as directly as I can, no one
does theory better than Frank Michelman.
But I want to praise a different Michelman as well: Michelman the doctrinalist.
With Michelman's dominance as a theorist of takings law as dominant as it is, it is easy
to overlook or underplay his contribution to takings law strictly at the level of doc-
trinal and case analysis. At this level as well, Michelman has no rival.
Let's go back to the Property, Utility, and Fairness article. In this sprawling, com-
plex, magisterial work (I sometimes think of it as takings law's counterpart to Mahler' s
Symphony of a Thousand), Michelman's powers as a doctrinal analyst are in full dis-
play. Two contributions are especially notable. The first is his account and critique of
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am grateful to Professor Eric
Kades for inviting me to the conference honoring Frank Michelman, whose work has inspired
me for many years and whose friendship I treasure.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman,
Ethical Foundations].
2 Id. at 1219-24.
3 Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Prop-
erty, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1319 (1987).
4 Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987,88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1988) [hereinafter Michel-
man, Takings].
5 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993) (discussing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
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the permanent physical occupation test, commonly associated with the 1982 Loretto6
decision.7 Michelman anticipated not only Loretto's categorical approach but facts
similar to Loretto itself.8 He pointed out that "courts, while they sometimes do hold
nontrespassory injuries compensable, never deny compensation for a physical take-
over."9 He went on to say that
[t]he one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropria-
tion) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, "regularly" use, or "permanently" occupy,
space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private own-
ership. This may be true although the invasion is practically trifling from
the owner's point of view. 0
Michelman identified the two flaws with this rule of decision that are well-known
today: the fortuitousness of the permanent physical occupation factor and its ele-
vation of purely nominal harms to the level of a constitutional violation. " Both of
these factors figured prominently in the withering criticisms that commentators leveled
at Loretto.' 2 In rejecting Justice Marshall's seeming elevation of form over substance,
these critics were only restating points that Michelman had already made abun-
dantly clear.' 3
The second doctrinal contribution of that article that I want to single out here co-
ncerns another familiarjudicial test, the Hadacheck14 doctrine. As we all know, that
doctrine provides that government actions that prevent or abate public harms are non-
compensable, even when that action inflicts very substantial losses on private owners.'
The problem in this test is now familiar to all takings mavens: a government land-
use restriction that is sustained on the ground that it prevents a public harm can just
as easily be characterized as one that extracts a benefit for the public, an action that
6 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
7 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1184-90, 1226-29.
' Compare id. at 1185 (discussing installation of subterranean utility lines), with Loretto,
458 U.S. at 422 (finding the installation of television cables on the roof and side of a building
constituted a taking).
9 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1184.
'0 Id. at 1184-85.
" Id. at 1226-27.
2 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 613-14 (1984); John J. Constonis, Presumptive and
Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 505-09
(1983); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Property Rights in the Balance-The Burger Court and Con-
stitutional Property, 43 MD. L. REv. 518, 566-68 (1984).
13 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1185.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
'5 Id. at 410-11.
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presumably requires compensation. Whether the government is more aptly charac-
terized as harm-preventing than benefit-conferring requires a neutral benchmark.
Is a regulation forbidding roadside billboards, Michelman asked, one that prevents
the harms of roadside blight and distraction or one that secures the public benefits of
safety and amenity? 6 As Michelman put it, this test "will not work unless we can es-
tablish a benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which enables us to say where refusal to
confer benefits... slips over into readiness to inflict harms."'1 Joe Sax had recog-
nized the problem and recast it in terms of his "enterprise/arbitration" approach. 8
Michelman showed that this approach is subject to the same basic challenge:
why should it be thought less odious for society to force a landowner to
contribute without compensation to the welfare of his neighbors (those
who suffer from his nuisance-like activities) than to the welfare of all of us
(who suffer from his refusal to dedicate his land to public uses)? 9
But Michelman did not throw the baby out with the bath. He recognized that
there is a stubborn intuitive appeal to the distinction, and he dug deeper, much deeper
than anyone else had or has since, to see if the harm-prevention/benefit-conferring
distinction, which so many courts seemed to find sensible, indeed does usefully serve
some other analytical purpose. 20 His answer, of course, was yes:21 "The true office
of the harm-prevention/benefit-extraction dichotomy is... to help us decide whether
a potential occasion of compensation exists at all. '22 The distinction does not help
us decide what efficiency and fairness require by way of compensation, but it does
help us recognize situations that do not raise any compensation issue at all because
the social action in question is one that merely corrects some prior theft-like redis-
tribution or deliberate redistributive gamble, rather than collectively pursuing an
efficient use of resources. 23 The intuitive appeal of the distinction, Michelman saw,
was that activities restricted by harm-preventing measures are usually of the theft
or gamble-like variety, which are a matter of corrective justice or other non-efficiency
reason; whereas activities restricted by public-benefit-conferring measures typically
are efficiency-based, raising the compensation question.24
Now, characteristically, Michelman took pains to caution against drawing any sharp
distinction between these two types of measures.2' You should not always assume that
16 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1197.
17 Id.
" Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-64 (1964).
'9 Michelman, Ethical Foundations, supra note 1, at 1201.
20 Id. at 1235.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1239.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 Id. at 1236-37.
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no legitimate compensation issue is raised by a regulation that is ostensibly nuisance-
abating or that a legitimate compensation question is always posed by a measure
that seems to be a restriction on innocent activity for efficiency's sake.26 The distinctive
should not be determinative, but it should be considered in deciding whether there
is a compensation question at all.27 Once again, Michelman's strong instinct for stan-
dards and against categorical rules is in full view. Once again, Michelman rigorously
explains how a conventional takings doctrine, properly understood, operates in a rational
and fair way.28
Fast-forward to 1988. Michelman's lead contribution to the Columbia symposium,
The Jurisprudence of Takings, dissected four major and well-known Supreme Court
takings cases from the 1986-87 Term.29 His aim, as he put it, was to "give a cogent
account of the[] decisions," rather than to "grandly theorize either them or the constitu-
tional texts they construe."3 Specifically, he set out to see if the cases fit within an
existing pattern of regulatory takings cases and to explain that pattern.3
The result was illuminating, to say the least. The pattern that Michelman saw was
a reaction against the failure, over sixty-five years, for the Court's informal open-
ended balancing approach to consistently yield victories for the claimant.32 The Court
was, as he put it, "moving noticeably towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings
doctrine."33 But it was not some crude version of legal formality that Michelman
saw.34 What he saw in the four cases was a much subtler and more limited variety
of formalism.35 He gave Nollan,36 for example, a narrow reading that, as he put it,
"fully explain[ed] the opinion and its result without, implausibly, turning Nollan into
Lochner redivivus."37 It has since become clear that Nollan, even extended by its sub-
sequent partner, Dolan,3" was mostly certainly not "Lochner redivivus." What nettled
the Court in both cases was the coerced sacrifice of the owner's right to exclude the
public, a fact that, as Michelman pointed out with respect to Nollan, put the cases in
the vicinity of Loretto, with its per se takings rule.39 Michelman's rendering of the
26 Id. at 1237-38.
217 Id. at 1238-39.
28 See id. at 1241.
29 See Michelman, Takings, supra note 4.
30 Id. at 1601.
31 id.
32 Id. at 1621-22. During this period, only two cases were decided in favor of claimants.
Id. at 1621 n.105.
33 Id. at 1622.
3 See id.
35 Id.
36 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
37 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1609 (contrasting Nollan with Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
38 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
39 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1608.
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limited impact of Nollan seems to have been confirmed in subsequent decisional law,
even taking Dolan into account.
Similarly, Michelman read First English4° in a way that made the regulation's in-
definite duration, the key to the case.4' He rejected a broader reading (like Justice
Stevens did) that would have made the case a broad endorsement of the principle of
"conceptual severance by time shares." '42 Here again, subsequent developments have
borne out the perspicacity of Michelman' s narrow reading, for it squares nicely with
Justice Stevens's analysis in Tahoe-Sierra.43 In fact, at the end of his discussion of First
English, Michelman posed a hypothetical that nearly matched the facts of Tahoe-Sierra
itself, for a time-limited building moratorium." As Michelman correctly predicted,
the Court there "regard[ed] [the] case as presenting a new and unresolved question."45
I could go on with many more examples of Michelman's prescient and illuminat-
ing readings of cases and rules of decision in takings jurisprudence, but time is limited
and I think my point is apparent by now. Let me close with a radical thought: rereading
Michelman's analyses of takings doctrine in these and other articles made me think that
there is a lot more coherence in takings law than conventional wisdom acknowledges.
Those who repeat the conventional wisdom that there is no logic or order in takings
need to spend some more time reading Michelman, the master doctrinalist.
0 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
4" Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1616-17.
42 Id. at 1617-19.
4' Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
44 Michelman, Takings, supra note 4, at 1621.
41 Id.; accord Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 320-21.
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